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Abstract Complex economic models often lack the structure for the application
of standard techniques in monotone comparative statics. Generalized monotonicity
analysis (GMA) extends the available methods in several directions. First, it provides
a way of finding parameter moves that yield monotonicity of model solutions. Sec-
ond, it allows studying the monotonicity of functions or subsets of variables. Third,
GMA naturally provides bounds on the sensitivity of variables to parameter changes.
Fourth, GMA may be used to derive conditions under which monotonicity obtains
with respect to functions of parameters, corresponding to imposed parameter moves.
Fifth, GMA contributes insights into the theory of comparative statics, for example,
with respect to dealing with constraints or exploiting additional information about the
model structure. Several applications of GMA are presented, including constrained
optimization, nonsupermodular games, aggregation, robust inference, and monotone
comparative dynamics.
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1 Introduction
The comparison of model predictions, typically described in terms of solutions to
an optimization or equilibrium problem, for different parameter values is the subject
of comparative statics (Hicks 1939; Samuelson 1941). Of particular interest is the
monotonicity of solutions in model parameters, giving rise to monotone comparative
statics (MCS). Until the appearance of ordinal methods, the standard tool of MCS
was, beyond direct computation of solutions, the implicit function theorem (IFT). The
introduction of ordinal methods, particularly by Topkis (1968), Milgrom and Shannon
(1994), and Athey (2002), has allowed researchers to characterize MCS in terms of
sufficient (and in some sense necessary) conditions on the primitives of the model.
The standard approach to MCS takes the formulation of the problem (which repre-
sents the model) as given. It cannot deliver positive results when monotonicity does
not obtain with respect to the original variables and parameters. However, interest-
ing monotonicity properties may generally be found when one broadens the horizon
to the monotonicity of functions of variables with respect to functions of parameters.
This paper presents a simple method, referred to as Generalized monotonicity analysis
(GMA), to systematically uncover and analyze monotonicity properties of solutions
to optimization or equilibrium problems. In GMA, parameters are allowed to move
simultaneously in the parameter space, and monotonicity is investigated for functions
of model solutions. The approach, which is fundamentally geometric, also sheds new
light on existing comparative-statics results. GMA introduces several concepts, such
as ‘pseudo-gradients’ and ‘monotonicity directions’, which may help applied econo-
mists to disentangle various issues that arise when trying to analyze the monotonicity
properties of their models, even when model complexity rules out the use of standard
MCS tools. The GMA approach raises questions beyond standard comparative-statics
analysis. For example, one may ask what structure is required for the variables of a
problem to be monotonic in some parameter aggregate (Sect. 4.3). In problems where
parameters represent heterogeneity across some agents, one may ask what notion of
“increased homogeneity” improves their incentives (Sect. 4.2). More generally, Sect. 3
shows that GMA discloses all monotonicity properties relating solutions of a problem
to its parameters given the available information (Theorem 1).
GMA extends comparative statics in yet another direction, namely the study of
the rates at which solutions vary with parameters. This application of GMA is called
quantitative monotonicity analysis. As one of the many potential applications of quan-
titative monotonicity analysis, we employ it in Sect. 4.4 to obtain rate constraints in a
well-known problem of robust inference concerned with the empirical determination
of firms’ productivity levels.
The gist of GMA can be described as follows. Consider a model described by the
parameterized equation
f (x, t) = 0,
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where x ∈ Rn is the variable, t ∈ Rm is the parameter, and f takes values in Rn . For
any t , let x(t) denote the solution to the above system, which, for this introductory
exposition, is assumed to be unique. For each t , let R(t) ⊂ Rn denote an information
set known to contain the solution: x(t) ∈ R(t). Assume, still for this introduction, that
the Jacobian matrix Dx f of f with respect to x is everywhere invertible. For each
nonzero vector v of Rm , consider the vector
W (x, t, v) = −[Dx f ]−1(x, t)(∂ f/∂v),
where ∂ f/∂v is the directional derivative of f in direction v. We call this vector
a pseudo-gradient along direction v, because it coincides with the actual gradient
of x(t) with respect to v, if one substitutes x = x(t) in the expression for W (x, t, v).
The family W¯ (t, v|R) = {W (x, t, v)}x∈R(t) of all pseudo-gradients on the informa-
tion set contains essential information about solution sensitivity to parameters: even
though the exact location of x(t) may be unknown, the reaction of x(t) to a parameter
change in direction v is contained in W¯ (t, v|R). The key, then, is to determine prop-
erties of W¯ (t, v|R) that permit statements about which parameter moves will affect
solutions monotonically. The simplest case is when W¯ (t, v|R) is a singleton. Suppose,
for example, that W¯ (t, e j |R)={w j (t)}, where e j is the j-th basis vector of Rm . In
general, w j (t) may have some negative components: moving from t along the arbitrary
direction e j does not necessarily increase all components of x(t). However, suppose
that we can find real numbers λ j (t) such that
∑
j λ j (t)w j (t) is a positive vector. Then,
moving from parameter t in direction v(t)= ∑ j λ j (t)e j increases all components of
the solution x(t), at least locally. We call such directions of parameter changes mono-
tonicity directions at t . It turns out that the set V (t |R) of all monotonicity directions at
t is a convex cone,1 which is referred to as the GMA-cone at t . In general, W¯ (t, v|R)
contains multiple elements. One can show that the smaller the set W¯ (t, v|R) (in the
inclusion order) and the larger the GMA-cone V (t |R) at t , the easier it becomes to
find parameter moves along which solutions are monotonic. Selecting a vector field of
monotonicity directions (contained in V (t |R) at each t) yields trajectories along which
a model solution (or smooth selections thereof, in the general case of a set-valued solu-
tion) is necessarily monotonic. Instead of considering the monotonicity of a model
solution directly, GMA can be applied to a function of the solution, such as an average
(discussed in Sect. 4.3). Lastly, we stress that the method permits the natural use of
additional information about solutions through the information set R(t). For example,
if the equation f (x, t) = 0 represents the first-order necessary optimality condition
of a maximization problem, then R(t) may consist of all x that also satisfy the sec-
ond-order condition, Dx f (x, t) ≤ 0. A smaller information set R(t) results in smaller
pseudo-gradient sets W¯ (t, v|R), and hence in larger GMA-cones V (t |R) (Theorem 2).
Note that instead of its straightforward use to merely guarantee the monotonicity of
model solutions along parameter paths, GMA can also be employed to influence the
rate at which solutions vary with parameters, a more quantitative approach to MCS
developed in Sect. 3.5.
1 The cone may be empty. In that case, given one’s information about the sensitivity of x to the parameters,
it is impossible to construct parameter moves that guarantee an increase in the solution (cf. Theorem 1).
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When analyzing monotonicity properties of solutions to a given problem, results
naturally depend on the concept of monotonicity that is being used. For example,
a comparative-statics analysis based on ordinal methods usually describes the
monotonicity of solutions in the strong set order.2 In noncooperative games with stra-
tegic complementarities, equilibrium monotonicity is typically limited to the smallest
and the largest equilibria (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). However, Echenique (2002)
shows that, in such games, monotonicity results can be extended to all stable equilib-
ria. Allowing for less structured (e.g., nonsupermodular) environments, we allow for
any differentiable (or at least right-differentiable) selection of the solution set X (t)
and propose a systematic way to investigate properties of such a selection. GMA can
generate statements of the following nature.
Each differentiable solution is nondecreasing as parameters are moved in this
direction or along that trajectory.
The differential nature of such statements may or may not restrict the strength of the
results, and can sometimes be relaxed to yield more general statements. The follow-
ing five points further clarify how GMA can be applied. First, as mentioned earlier,
GMA may be used as an exploratory step to elicit monotonicity properties of a com-
plex problem. Directly applying ordinal methods to a complex problem may often
require much ingenuity or expertise, or may simply fail if one restricts attention to the
original variables and parameters. In contrast, the method proposed here is based on
elementary differential calculus and provides a helpful start to explore monotonicity.
The results of this first step may then be derived under more general conditions using
ordinal methods.3 In general, one should think of differential and ordinal methods
as complements, whose strengths can be combined to yield sharp and general results
when analyzing the monotonicity of solutions to an optimization or equilibrium prob-
lem. Second, in many problems the solution is generically unique, so that the question
of which selections to consider naturally disappears when X (t) is a singleton that is
differentiable in t . If there are multiple solutions that are locally unique, GMA consid-
ers monotonicity of each corresponding selection, and thus necessarily also the most
interesting ones (e.g., stable selections).4 Third, in equilibrium analysis, one may be
interested precisely in equilibrium evolutions that are smooth with respect to param-
eters. Indeed, ruling out solutions that suddenly jump after an infinitesimal parame-
ter move may be a desirable assumption when analyzing equilibrium monotonicity.5
Fourth, GMA easily accommodates the introduction of additional constraints to dis-
criminate between solutions. For example, nonnegativity of solutions may be imposed
as an additional inequality to the information set R(t). Fifth, monotonicity can be
2 X (s) ≤ X (t) in the strong set order (Veinott 1989) if and only if (x, y) ∈ X (s) × X (t) implies that (x ∧
y, x ∨ y) ∈ X (s)× X (t), where x ∧ y denotes the componentwise minimum and x ∨ y the componentwise
maximum of the two vectors x and y.
3 For example, such exploration was used in Quah and Strulovici (2008).
4 The transversality theorem provides simple conditions under which differentiability of solutions obtains
generically, as a consequence of the invertibility of Dx f (Guillemin and Pollack 1974, p. 68).
5 Similar assumptions are often made in optimization problems, cf. Persico (2000, Assumption A1).
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weak or strict, or even stronger. While ordinal methods yield weak monotonicity, the
differential nature of GMA makes is possible to establish strict monotonicity results.6
As noted earlier, GMA can be used in the form of ‘quantitative monotonicity analy-
sis’ to obtain explicit bounds for the response rate of model solutions to changes in
parameters.7
GMA extends the boundaries of MCS conceptually by providing a systematic
method for investigating the interplay between model structure and available infor-
mation (including voluntary restrictions) about model solutions. The approach is con-
structive, as it endogenously generates the largest cones of directions in the parameter
space that are compatible with monotonicity.8 Parameter directions found this way
are likely to have an intuitive interpretation (for example, they can express a notion of
“proximity,” as in Sect. 4.2), which can be difficult to determine otherwise.
The paper builds on Strulovici and Weber (2008), providing more general foun-
dations and results for monotonicity analysis, examining new issues such as quan-
titative monotonicity analysis and robustness, and proposing economic applications
that illustrate the versatility of the method. Section 2 introduces the concepts of the
paper. Section 3 contains core theoretical results. Section 4 provides applications
of GMA to constrained optimization, nonsupermodular games, aggregation theory,
quantitative monotonicity analysis, and monotone comparative dynamics. Section 5
concludes.
2 Concepts and notation
The GMA approach seeks to establish the monotonicity of a ‘criterion’ in certain
parameter movements. The (monotonicity) criterion is a function of a variable that
solves a ‘primitive equation.’ The approach can accommodate additional solution
requirements which are not encoded in the primitive equation, but are available in the
form of an ‘information structure.’ An information structure describes a subset of solu-
tions to the primitive equation. The method proceeds to compute ‘pseudo-gradients’
to estimate the criterion change in the different parameter directions. These estimates
are then used to obtain ‘monotonicity directions’ in the parameter space, along which
a criterion change is guaranteed to be nonnegative.
Primitive equation. Let X (t) denote the set of solutions x(t) to the primitive equa-
tion
f (x, t) = 0, (1)
6 Edlin and Shannon (1998) focus on strict monotonicity of solutions. Their analysis is based on differen-
tiability and first-order conditions. Baldenius and Reichelstein (2000) provide bounds on price changes in
the context of monopoly pricing.
7 See Sect. 3.5 and the application in Sect. 4.4.
8 Jensen (2007) also considers general cones for comparative statics. However, in his analysis the direction
cones are treated as exogenous primitives.
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Fig. 1 GMA primitives (for xˆ = φ(x) ≡ x)
where the (decision) variable x lies in a smooth manifold X ⊆ Rn , the param-
eter t lies in a convex subset T of Rm , and f : Rn × Rm → Rn (with n ≥ 1) is a
continuously differentiable (smooth) function.9
Monotonicity criterion. Instead of considering only the monotonicity of solutions
x(t) to the primitive equation, we introduce a monotonicity criterion xˆ = φ(x),
where φ is a d-dimensional differentiable function of x (the notation xˆ will sometimes
be used instead of φ(x) for simplicity). For example, monotonicity of the first com-
ponent of x(t) can be examined by setting φ(x) = x1. The criterion can also be used
to examine the monotonicity of aggregates of the original variables. If, for example,
x = (x1, . . . , xn) represents consumption decisions of n individuals, then the compar-
ative statics of aggregate consumption can be examined by choosing a criterion of the
form φ(x) = x1+· · ·+xn . To avoid obscuring the exposition of the GMA-method, we
often de-emphasize the presence of the criterion φ by simply writing xˆ instead of φ(x).
Analyzing the monotonicity of the original variables amounts to setting φ(x) = x or,
equivalently, xˆ = x .
Information structure. For any t ∈ T , let R(t) ⊂ X (t) denote the subset of solu-
tions to (1) which satisfy a number of additional constraints, given a parameter value
of t . Such additional constraints may include nonnegativity, second-order conditions,
or stability requirements, depending on whether (1) derives from an optimization or
an equilibrium problem.10 The collection R = {R(t)}t∈T defines a parameterized
information structure of the problem. The crucial point is that, when searching for
monotonicity directions, one may be able to exploit not only the fact that any ele-
ment x(t) of R(t) solves the primitive equation (by definition), but also that it satisfies
the additional requirements implied by the inclusion x(t) ∈ R(t). A map x : t 
→
9 All of our results can easily be extended to allow for infinite-dimensional parameters, although, for sim-
plicity, we focus on the case with finite-dimensional parameter vectors. Some of the results also generalize
to infinite-dimensional variables, as in Sect. 4.5.
10 GMA (particularly Theorem 3 and Corollary 1) can be extended to conditions that cannot be summarized
by a subset of X , for example conditions involving derivatives of x(t). Such conditions can be useful to
narrow down the set of pseudo-gradients, as in the example of Sect. 4.1.
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x(t) ∈ R(t) is a selection of R. We say that R is a refinement of R′, denoted by R ⊆ R′,
if R(t) ⊆ R′(t) for all t .
Parameter paths. A continuously differentiable map γ : [0, 1] → T is called a
path of the parameter space. A parameter t ∈ T is on γ if t = γ (λ) for some λ ∈
[0, 1]. A path γ starts at t ∈ T if γ (0) = t . It starts at t in the direction v ∈ Rm
if γ˙ (0+) = dγ /dλ|λ=0+ = v. A path γ that starts at t in the direction v will be
referred to as a (t, v)-path. A selection x of R is γ -differentiable if λ 
→ x(γ (λ)) is
differentiable on (0, 1), and is right-differentiable at 0.
Pseudo-gradients. A pseudo-gradient of f at (x, t) in direction v is a vector w
in Rn such that
Dx f (x, t) w + Dv f (x, t) = 0 (2)
for some x ∈ R(t). The set of pseudo-gradients is denoted by W (x, t, v). This is the
set of potential gradients assumed by any smooth selection of R, as the parameter
moves from t in direction v. Since any solution to (1) at t which may be of interest
is localized to the information set R(t), the set of all possible pseudo-gradients for a
parameter movement from t in direction v is
W¯ (t, v|R) = {w ∈ W (x, t, v) : x ∈ R(t)}. (3)
The set W¯ (t, v|R) contains all vectors of Rn which may be actual gradients of some
differential solution to (1) as the parameter moves from t in direction v.
Monotonicity path. γ is a monotonicity path if xˆ = φ(x) is nondecreasing along γ
for any γ -differentiable selection x .
Table 1 Summary of notation
Symbol Dimension Interpretation
x ∈ X n Variable
xˆ = φ(x) ∈ φ(X ) d ∈ {1, . . . , n} Monotonicity criterion
t ∈ T m Parameter
v ∈ Rm m Parameter direction
w(x, t) ∈ Rn n Pseudo-gradient of f at (x, t) in direction v, satisfies (2)
φ : X → Rd d Criterion function
γ : [0, 1] → T m Path in the parameter space
R(t) n Information set at t (= subset of X (t))
X (t) n Set of solutions to (1) at t
V (t |R) m GMA-cone at t given R, defined in (4)
W (x, t, v) n Set of pseudo-gradients at (x, t) in direction v
W¯ (t, v|R) n Set of pseudo-gradients at t in direction v (= ∪x∈R(t) W (x, t, v))
X ⊂ Rn n Set of feasible decisions (= manifold)
T ⊂ Rm m Parameter set (and the underlying vector space)
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Monotonicity directions. Given an information structure R and a parameter t ∈ T ,
let
V (t |R) = {v ∈ Rm : Dφ(x)w ≥ 0, x ∈ R(t), w ∈ W (x, t, v)} (4)
denote the set of parameter directions in which the monotonicity criterion is nonde-
creasing.11 As is shown in the next section, V (t |R) forms a convex cone, containing
the initial directions of all monotonicity paths starting at t . It will henceforth be referred
to as the GMA-cone at t .
Table 1 summarizes the notation, and Fig. 1 depicts the main GMA primitives.
3 Theoretical results
In this section, we first show that the set of pseudo-gradients contains all actual gradi-
ents of smooth selections of R (Proposition 1). We then establish that the set V (t |R)
of monotonicity directions is a convex cone (Proposition 2), that this cone contains all
directions guaranteeing monotonicity of φ evaluated at the solutions (Theorem 1, the
“necessity” part), and that the cone widens as R becomes more informative (Proposi-
tion 2). We then establish that trajectories following directions in the GMA-cone are
monotonicity paths for φ (Theorem 3, the “sufficiency” part), and provide a simple
characterization of monotonicity when Dx f is invertible (Corollary 1). After sum-
marizing the different steps of GMA, we show how information contained in R may
be folded into the primitive Eq. (1), which establishes a form of equivalence between
various initial descriptions of any given problem. The analysis is then modified to
consider several other important concepts of monotonicity: strict monotonicity and
quantitative monotonicity (Propositions 4, 5). The latter concept, which to the best of
our knowledge is new, can be used to derive “robust” comparative statics, as illustrated
by Sect. 4.4 in the context of productivity estimation. Another theoretical aspect of the
method, concerning the inclusion of constraints, is treated as an illustrative application
in Sect. 4.1.
3.1 Construction and properties of monotonicity paths
Proposition 1 (Pseudo-gradients) If γ is a (t, v)-path and x a γ -differentiable selec-







x(γ (λ)) ∈ W (x(t), t, v).
Proof Right-differentiating both sides of f (x(γ (λ)), γ (λ)) = 0 at λ = 0+ yields






+ Dv f (x(t), t) = 0,
which satisfies (2) with x(t) ∈ R(t). unionsq
11 While the GMA-cone clearly depends on the criterion function φ, we choose to ignore this dependence
in the notation.
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The next result characterizes the shape of the set of all directions v in which the
monotonicity criterion increases.
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity directions) For any t , V (t |R) is a convex cone.
Proof Let t ∈ T . We first show that V (t |R) is a cone. It clearly contains the origin.
For any t , v ∈ V (t |R), α > 0, and x ∈ R(t), we have W (x, t, αv) = αW (x, t, v),
since Dαv f = αDv f . Therefore, Dφ(x)w ≥ 0 for w ∈ W (x, t, αv) if and only
if Dφ(x)w ≥ 0 for w ∈ W (x, t, v). To establish the convexity of V (t |R), consider
any v, v′ ∈ V (t |R) and x ∈ R(t). Since Dv+v′ f (x, t) = Dv f (x, t) + Dv′ f (x, t), it
follows that W (x, t, v + v′) = W (x, t, v)+ W (x, t, v′), and hence that Dφ(x)w ≥ 0
for all w ∈ W (x, t, v + v′). Since the last inequality holds for all x ∈ R(t), it follows
that v + v′ ∈ V (t |R). unionsq
We now show that V (·|R), when considered on its entire domain T , generates all
monotonicity paths along which the criterion is monotonic. Since GMA is concerned
with smooth solutions, we assume (possibly by restricting the information structure)
that for all t , each element of R(t) can be reached by a smooth selection of R. Precisely,
R is smooth if for any path γ , parameter t on γ , and vector x ∈ R(t), there exists
a γ -differentiable selection y of R such that y(t) = x . Smooth information structures
rule out isolated points in the graph of X (t), which are irrelevant for the GMA concept
of monotonicity.
Theorem 1 (Necessity) Suppose that R is smooth and that v /∈ V (t |R). Then there
exists a (t, v)-path γ and a γ -differentiable selection x such that some component of
the criterion xˆ = φ(x) is decreasing in a right-neighborhood of λ = 0.
Proof By definition, v /∈ V (t |R) implies that there exist x ∈ R(t), w ∈ W (x, t, v),
and i ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that the i-th component of Dφ(x)w is negative. Let γ be
any path such that γ (0) = t and γ˙ (0+) = v. By smoothness of R, there exists a
γ -differentiable selection x of R such that x(0) = x . By construction, the i-th com-
ponent of Dφ(x(0))w is negative for w ∈ W (x, t, γ˙ (0+)), implying that φi (x(γ (λ)))
is decreasing in a right-neighborhood of λ = 0. unionsq
Thus, the set V (t |R) is in effect the largest cone of directions v (i.e., the “GMA-
cone”) at t , for which the criterion xˆ(t) is guaranteed to be monotonic at the beginning
of any (t, v)-path.
The mapping V (·|R) can be viewed as a set-valued vector field: trajectories gen-
erated by V (·|R) are parameter paths with the property that at any t on such a path,
the direction of the path belongs to V (t |R). As the notation indicates, the shape of
the cone V (t |R) depends on the point t in the parameter space and on the available
information structure R. Standard methods in comparative statics consider only the
case where the GMA-cone is fixed to the positive orthant, i.e., where V (t |R) = Rm+.
Trajectories generated by such a cone require that all components of the parameter
path be nondecreasing. Here, by contrast, the GMA-cone V (t |R) is determined endog-
enously by the primitives and the available additional information about solutions to
the problem (1). As the information structure becomes finer, the GMA-cone cannot
become smaller.
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Theorem 2 (Information-structure refinements) If R⊆R′, then V (t |R′)⊆V (t |R) for
all t∈T .
Proof For a given t ∈ T fix an arbitrary v ∈ V (t |R′). Then for any x ∈ R(t) ⊂ R′(t)
and any w ∈ W (x, t, v) we have Dφ(x)w ≥ 0, which implies by (4) that v ∈ V (t |R).
unionsq
The finer the available information structure about the solution set, the larger the set
of monotonicity directions in the parameter space. This establishes a partial order
over information structures R, which is similar to Blackwell’s (1951) order for the
comparison of information sources.12
The next result is the backbone of the GMA-method: it states that the criterion xˆ is
nondecreasing along any direction of the cone V .
Theorem 3 (Sufficiency) If γ is a path such that
γ˙ (λ) ∈ V (γ (λ)|R) (5)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1], then it is a monotonicity path.
Proof Fix any γ -differentiable selection x of R. For any λ ∈ [0, 1), let t = γ (λ)
and v = γ˙ (λ) (or the right-derivative of γ if λ = 0). By Proposition 1, Dvx(t) ∈
W (x(t), t, v). By construction of γ , this implies that Dφ(x(t))Dvx(t) ≥ 0. Now,
for λ < λ′, the fundamental theorem of calculus implies that




Dφ(x(γ ()))Dγ˙ ()x(γ ())d ≥ 0,
hence that the criterion xˆ(γ (λ)) is nondecreasing in λ. unionsq
The differential inclusion (5) describes the dynamics of monotonicity paths
(interpreting λ as time).13 When Dx f is invertible and T is finite-dimensional, the
pseudo-gradient is unique and can be directly computed, which simplifies the state-
ment of Theorem 3.
12 An information source A is at least as informative as an information source B in the sense of
Blackwell, if for any decision, subject to some minor technical requirements, the (outcome-contingent)
payoffs attainable using information source B can also be attained using information source A. Analo-
gously, an information set R is at least as useful for generating MCS as the information set R′ if R ⊆ R′,
since then W (t |R′) ⊆ W (t |R), i.e., the set of all monotonicity directions generated by R contains the one
generated by R′. If R′ is obtained from R by the removal of constraints, then the partial order is valid for
any problem of the form (1) in which X and T are fixed.
13 Differential inclusions are a standard tool in the description of dynamic systems (see, e.g., Smirnov
2002).
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Corollary 1 Suppose that v : T → Rm is a smooth vector field such that
− Dφ(x)
[
(Dx f )−1(x, t)Dt f (x, t)
]
v(t) ≥ 0 (6)
for all t ∈ T and x ∈ R(t). Then, trajectories generated by v are monotonicity paths
with respect to φ.
Proof With Dx f invertible, the only vector w satisfying (2) is −[Dx f ]−1 Dv f , so
that the condition (4) for all x ∈ R(t) and w ∈ W (x, t, v) reduces to (6). unionsq
3.2 Method summary
The GMA approach can be summarized as follows.
1. Step 1 (Pseudo-gradients) For all relevant t and v, use (3) to compute the set of
pseudo-gradients. This set describes the possible changes of any smooth selection
of R along any (t, v)-path, or – in other words – the solution sensitivity to any
(smooth) change of parameters at t in direction v.
2. Step 2 (GMA-cone) For each t , solve (4) to determine the convex cone V (t |R) of
monotonicity directions at t .
Alternatively, one may wish to impose a cone of monotonicity directions and
derive conditions on the primitives under which parameter changes of interest
are monotonicity paths. For example, this is what standard comparative statics
does, when V is identically equal to the positive orthant. This approach is further
explored in Sect. 3.3.
3. Step 3 (Monotonicity paths) When the GMA-cone is not reduced to zero, select-
ing one monotonicity direction for each t generates a vector field. It is typically
possible to generate a smooth vector field (at least for a large subset of T ). Each
of its trajectories is then a monotonicity path. By Theorem 3 this can be accom-
plished by solving the differential inclusion (5). If, however, V (t |R) = {0}, one
needs to gather more information about the solutions to (1) to narrow down the
set of pseudo-gradients which by Proposition 2 can only widen the GMA-cone.
Alternatively, it may be useful to choose a less demanding criterion function φ,
for example by reducing its dimension d (which may be achieved by dropping or
aggregating variables).
4. Step 4 (Reparametrization [optional]) If monotonicity paths cover T , they may
naturally be used to provide a new parametrization of the initial problem, under
which monotonicity obtains with respect to the first of these new parameters. More
precisely, if one can find a (Lipschitz-continuous) function σ : T ×[0, 1] → Rm ,
such that
γ (0) = t, γ˙ (λ) = σ(γ (λ), λ) ∀ λ ∈ (0, 1) ⇒ γt (λ) = γ (λ) ∀ λ ∈ (0, 1)
for all t ∈ T , then, by the rectifiability theorem for direction fields (see, e.g.,
Arnold and Il’yashenko 1988), it is possible to (at least locally) transform coor-
dinates such that monotonicity is guaranteed. The function σ can be obtained by
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pasting together the differential equations that describe γt by selecting a continu-
ous σ such that
σ(t, λ) = γ˙t (λ) ∈ V (γt (λ)|R)
for all t ∈ S . One method is to use a (k − 1)-dimensional plane P that is trans-
verse (i.e., never collinear) to the (Lipschitz-continuous) vector field described
by v(t) = σ(γt (0), 0) for all t ∈ S . Then, any t ∈ S corresponds to a unique
point on the plane (described by the m − 1 contra-variant coordinates s2, . . . , sm)
and the time it takes to get to or from the plane P to t (described by the
co-variant coordinate s1), depending on the direction of the flow. This defines
a new parametrization t = ϕ(s) in s = (s1, . . . , sm) on S such that the crite-
rion xˆ(ϕ(s1, s2, . . . , sn)) is nondecreasing in s1.14
3.3 Imposed monotonicity paths
The method described thus far discloses all paths in the parameter space along which
the criterion xˆ = φ(x) is nondecreasing for all smooth solutions x . In some problems,
one may wish to reverse the question, and find conditions under which some particular
directions of the parameter space are guaranteed to yield monotonicity of φ(x). For
example, usual comparative statics consider the case in which V contains the positive
orthant of the parameter space. Such conditions can be tested by checking that extreme
rays of the corresponding GMA-cone, which are unit vectors of the parameter space,
belong to V . Imposing that extreme rays of the positive orthant belong to V generates
inequalities that are equivalent to the differential characterization of supermodularity
as applied to objective functions of optimization problems.
More generally, suppose that one wishes to ensure that a particular cone V0 of
parameter directions guarantees the monotonicity of smooth solutions (or some cri-
terion thereof), and let 	 denote a set of vertices (directions in T ) generating the
cone V0. Then the following result obtains, the proof of which is immediate and
therefore omitted.
Proposition 3 If 	 ⊂ V (t |R), then the criterion xˆ = φ(x) is nondecreasing along
any trajectory generated by V0, i.e., any path γ with γ˙ ∈ V0 is a monotonicity path.
Section 4.3 illustrates this result in the context of parameter aggregation.
3.4 Folding information into the primitive equation
The analysis so far has maintained a clear distinction between the primitive Eq. (1) and
the additional conditions imposed by the information structure R. In fact, the addi-
14 Further details on global reparametrizations, using additional tools in the theory of ordinary differential
equations, have been developed elsewhere (Strulovici and Weber 2008). As the applications in Sect. 4 dem-
onstrate, it is often enough to restrict attention to the first three steps of GMA to obtain a fairly complete
picture of the monotonicity properties of the solutions to a given problem of the form (1).
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tional information encapsulated in R can often be folded into the primitive equation.
To see this, consider an example. Suppose that
R(t) = {x ∈ X : g(x, t) = 0 and h(x, t) ≤ 0},
where the smooth constraint function h(x, t) takes values in Rk (with k ≥ 1). This
situation arises when (1) represents the first-order necessary optimality condition of
a maximization problem. The corresponding necessary second-order optimality con-
dition (at any interior solution x , not on the boundary of X ) is that fx (x, t) ≤ 0.
Define Z = X × Rk , z = (x, y) with y ∈ Rk . The information from R(t) can be
folded into the initial equation if f is extended to





h(x, t) + y2
⎤
⎦ ,
where y2 = ((y1)2, . . . , (yk)2) ∈ Rk+ represents a vector whose elements are the
nonnegative slacks associated with the components of the inequality constraint.
To further illustrate this technique, suppose that x is one-dimensional, and that
R(t) = {x : f (x, t) = 0 and fx (x, t) ≤ 0} ⊂ R. Consider any smooth selection x :
t 
→ x(t)of R. If fx (x(t), t) < 0, then x ′(t) = − ft (x(t), t)/ fx (x(t), t)by the implicit
function theorem. However, this theorem cannot be applied if fx (x(t), t) = 0. Suppose
now that the second-order condition is incorporated into f . The resulting equation is
fˆ (x, y, t) =
[ f (x, t)
fx (x, t) + y2
]
= 0.
Differentiating these equations yields15 relations: fx x ′ + ft = 0 and fxx x ′ + fxt +
2yy′ = 0. For y(t) = 0, fx is invertible and the implicit function theorem can
be used. If y(t0) = 0 for some parameter t0, the second relation yields x ′(t0) =
− fxt (x(t0), t0)/ fxx (x(t0), t0), which describes the sensitivity of the selection x(t)
at t0, despite the singularity of the equation at that particular parameter and
solution (as long as fxx (x(t0), t0) = 0). Thus, folding the second-order condition
into f implies sharp predictions for the pseudo-gradient, even at singularity points.16
15 Smoothness of y(t) obtains by the relation fx (x(t), t) + y2(t) = 0, as well as the smoothness of fx
and x in t .
16 As long as R(t) describes a closed subset of the solution X (t), the above method works. Indeed, a theorem
by Whitney (Postnikov 1987, p. 20) states that any closed set Z at t can be written in the form fˆ (z, t) = 0
with an appropriate function fˆ that is smooth in z. The smoothness of fˆ in (z, t) can also be guaranteed by
Whitney’s theorem, as long as the graph of the set-valued mapping, which assigns the relevant constraint
set Z (t) to each parameter value t , is closed.
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3.5 Quantitative monotonicity analysis
Another innovation of this paper is to examine at some degree of generality the rate
at which solutions are monotonic. We believe that this question, for which ordinal
methods are ill-suited, may arise in many important instances, as illustrated by the
application in Sect. 4.4. In contrast, this question is a natural extension of our method.
Quantitative monotonicity analysis investigates the magnitude of the change in the
solution to the primitive Eq. (1) as a consequence of parameter variations. We start by
extending our previous result to the strict monotonicity of solutions to (1), considering
directions in
Vˆ (t |R) = {v ∈ Rm : Dφ(x)w > 0, x ∈ R(t), w ∈ W (x, t, v)},
which for all t ∈ T is a subset of the GMA-cone V (t |R).
Proposition 4 If γ is a differentiable path such that γ˙ (λ) ∈ Vˆ (γ (λ)|R) for all λ ∈
[0, 1], then φ(x) is (strictly) increasing along γ .
Proof Consider any γ -differentiable selection x of R and λ ∈ [0, 1), and let t = γ (λ)
and v = γ˙ (λ) ∈ Vˆ (t |R). From Proposition 1, Dvx(t) ∈ W (x(t), t, v). By assumption,
Dφ(x(t))Dvx(t) > 0. For 0 ≤ λ < λ′ ≤ 1, it is
φ(x(λ′)) − φ(x(λ)) =
λ′∫
λ
Dφ(x(γ ()))Dγ˙ ()x(γ ())d.
The last integral is positive, which shows the result. unionsq
If one can find a positive lower bound for the sensitivity of the criterion, the result can
be strengthened as follows.
Proposition 5 (Quantitative monotonicity analysis) Let γ be a differentiable path. If
there exists a vector ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρd) with strictly positive components such that
w ∈ W¯ (γ (λ), γ˙ (λ)|R) , x ∈ R(γ (λ)) ⇒ Dφ (x(γ (λ)))w ≥ ρ
for all λ ∈ (0, 1), then
0 ≤ λ < λ′ ≤ 1 ⇒ xˆ(γ (λ′)) − xˆ(γ (λ)) ≥ ρ(λ′ − λ).
The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Proposition 4 and is, therefore, omit-
ted.17 By a similar argument, one can derive upper bounds on the rate of monotonicity.
Proposition 5 can be used, for example, to show that x increases faster (or slower) than
a parameter (taking ρ = 1). The value of ρ provides valuable information about the
rate of increase (or decrease), giving rise to quantitative statements. A simpler result
than Proposition 5 has been used when φ(x) = xi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, t is
finite-dimensional, and the path γ amounts to increasing a single component t j of the
parameter vector (Samuelson 1947). Indeed, suppose that Dx f is invertible and that
17 Proposition 5 can easily be extended to the case in which ρ is a function of the parameter.
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i= j=1. Then Corollary 1 with v = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T and Dφ = (1, 0, . . . , 0) yields the
condition m(x, t)Ta(x, t) ≥ ρ, where m(x, t) is the first row of the matrix −[Dx f ]−1
(x, t) and a(x, t) is the vector (d f1/dt1, d f2/dt1, . . . , d fn/dt1). An application of
quantitative monotonicity analysis to robust inference is provided in Sect. 4.4.
4 Applications
In Sect. 4.1, we show how constraints can be incorporated into the framework of
Sect. 3 and give two illustrations of GMA with constraints. The first recovers
Chipman’s (1977) normal–good theorem for supermodular, strongly concave utility
functions (Sect. 4.1). The second derives a condition on the marginal rate of substi-
tution of a utility function in order for a good to be a Giffen good. Section 4.2 is
a key application of the paper. It considers a nonsupermodular game in which each
player has two decisions (investment and location) and a one-dimensional type. Using
GMA, we obtain conditions for investment decisions to be nondecreasing in param-
eter directions that increase a certain ‘proximity’ between players. This application
also illustrates the use of criterion functions (to select a subset of the variables) and
of the GMA-cone (to describe parameter directions in which the players’ proximity
increases). The notion of proximity is derived endogenously. The subsequent appli-
cation, presented in Sect. 4.3, illustrates another aspect of GMA, demonstrating the
consequences of imposing a large cone of monotonicity directions. Specifically, it is
shown that requiring monotonicity with respect to any additive increasing function of
the parameters implies that the solution depends only on that function. The result is
proved for the case where the aggregate is a parameter sum. A simple transformation of
each parameter component generalizes this proof to any additive, increasing function
of the parameters. This result, which goes beyond pure comparative-statics analysis,
provides a good illustration of the use of GMA-cones. In Sect. 4.4, quantitative mono-
tonicity analysis is used as a tool for robust inference about unobservable parameters
in the context of productivity estimation. The last application, discussed in Sect. 4.5,
concerns comparative dynamics. More than all of the preceding applications, it shows
the importance of pseudo-gradients for monotonicity analysis. Proof is provided for
a general theorem for comparative dynamics, which implies a simple result about the
implications of local properties of the law of motion on the monotonicity of solutions
(related to Hugget 2003). It is then shown how global properties of the dynamic equa-
tion also can be exploited by the theorem, in a result that can be interpreted as a stylized
model of the influence of positive global cycles on the growth of individual firms.
4.1 Constrained optimization
Constrained optimization problems often prevent the use of ordinal methods, by vio-
lating crucial lattice assumptions.18 GMA can accommodate problem constraints in
18 A notable exception is Quah (2007) ordinal method, which provides conditions on the transformation
of constraints to guarantee monotonicity for the entire vector of decision variables.
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a natural manner, as long as they are described in terms of smooth functions.19 The
general argument is described first, then applied both to prove Chipman’s normal–
good theorem for supermodular, strongly concave utility functions, and to derive a




s.t. g(y, t) = 0,
where G : Rl ×Rm → Rl and g : Rl ×Rm → Rk are twice differentiable. A necessary
condition for optimality (Bertsekas 1995, p. 255) is the existence of a k-dimensional
vector ν such that at the optimum
F(y, ν, t) = DyG(y, t) + ν · Dy g(y, t) = 0.
Together with the k equations g(y, t) = 0, this determines a system of n = l + k
equations in n variables x = (y, ν),
f (x, t) =
[




corresponding to the primitive Eq. (1) of our analysis. The approach can easily be
extended to allow for both equality and inequality constraints (cf. Sect. 3.4).
4.1.1 Example: normal goods
As an illustration, consider the budget-constrained optimal-consumption problem
U (t) = max
y: g(y,t)=0 G(y),
where g(y, t) = p · y − t , p  0 denotes the price vector for a commodity bun-
dle y, and t > 0 is the available budget. Our goal is to show that if G is increasing,
strongly concave, and supermodular, then any smooth optimizer selection y(t) is non-
decreasing in t . The constraint g(y, t) = 0 does not define a lattice if there are three or
more goods.20 With G concave and differentiable, the first-order condition and budget
constraint can be written in the form






where x = (y, λ) and λ is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier associated with the
budget constraint.
19 As pointed out in Footnote 16 at the end of Sect. 3.4, provided that the problem constraints confine the
variable to a closed set, the assumption of a constraint representation in terms of smooth functions is not
restrictive, at least from a theoretical point of view.
20 With two goods, adopting the new order (reversing the sign of the quantity of the second good) is enough
to recover the lattice structure and show the result.
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In this problem, the natural criterion function is φ(x) = φ(y, λ) = y, since only
monotonicity in demand matters. The information set R(t) consists of two constraints.
The first constraint is the equation itself, f (x, t) = 0. The second constraint stems
from the observation that the value function U is concave in t as21 the maximum
of a concave function subject to the convex constraint p · y ≤ t . Since λ = U ′(t),
concavity of U implies that λ′(t) ≤ 0. The constraints f (x, t) = 0 and λ′(t) ≤ 0
define the information structure of the problem. Finally, normal–good monotonicity
means that any wealth increase should increase demand in all goods. This implies
that the GMA-cone must be V = [0,∞) (since t lies in R, a nontrivial GMA-cone is
necessarily one of the rays [0,∞) or (−∞, 0]).
For any x and t , the pseudo-gradients w(x, t) must solve, by definition,
[
Dy f wy(x, t) − pwλ(x, t)
p · wy(x, t) − 1
]
= 0,
where wy and wλ are the components of w corresponding to y and λ. Strong concavity
of G implies that Dy f is invertible. Since G is concave and supermodular, the diago-
nal elements of Dy f are nonpositive, while its off-diagonal elements are nonnegative.
This implies (see, e.g., Samuelson 1947) that all elements of [Dy f ]−1 are nonpositive.
Therefore, wy(x, t) = wλ(x, t)[Dy f ]−1 p has nonnegative components. This proves
the following result.
Proposition 6 (Normal goods) If G is strongly concave, supermodular, and twice
differentiable, then yi (t) is nondecreasing in t for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The result is identical to Chipman (1977). The proof there is very similar to ours, but
does not proceed from a general approach to comparative statics: it uses properties
of the indirect utility function instead of treating Lagrange multipliers as part of an
enlarged system of equations. This leads to one subtle difference: while we exploit the
fact that the Lagrange multiplier has a nonpositive derivative to prove good normality,
Chipman first shows that demand either increases for all goods or decreases for all
goods, and concludes by observing that, the budget having expanded, all demand has
necessarily increased for some good.22
4.1.2 Example: giffen goods
Consider the budget-constrained optimal-consumption problem
max
(x,y)∈B(p,q) u(x, y) (7)
where u is increasing and concave, p, q are positive prices, and consumption (x, y)
is constrained by the budget set
B(p, q) = {(x, y) ≥ 0 : px + qy ≤ 1} .
21 See for example Luenberger (1969, p. 216).
22 See also Quah (2007) for a treatment of comparative statics of this and other constrained optimization
problems without differentiability assumptions.
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We use GMA to derive conditions under which the second good, say, behaves as a
Giffen good, i.e., such that the demand y(p, q) for the second good increases in q. We




ux (x, y) − λp
uy(x, y) − λq
px + qy − 1
⎤
⎦ = 0, (8)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
Applying Step 1 of the GMA-method (cf. Sect. 3.2) yields a description of the set
of pseudo-gradients as a solution to
⎡
⎣
uxx (x, y) uxy(x, y) −p























in terms of w = (wx , wy, wλ)T for any given parameter vector (p, q), candidate solu-
tion (x, y), and (nonzero) parameter direction (vp, vq). Using a symbolic solver (and







(xvp + yvq) + uxuy
(

















(xµx + µ)vp + (yµx − µ2)vq
µµy − µx , (10)
where µ(x, y) = ux (x, y)/uy(x, y) > 0 is the consumer’s marginal rate of substi-
tution between the two goods. To characterize situations where the second good is a
Giffen good, we use the alternative Step 2 (cf. Sect. 3.3) of the method by imposing the
parameter change vp = 0 and vq = 1, and asking that wy be nonnegative. Concavity23
of u can be used to show that the denominator in the rightmost expression of (10) is
positive. This yields the following result.
Proposition 7 (Giffen goods) y(p, q) is (locally) increasing in q if and only if µ2 <
yµx evaluated at (x(p, q), y(p, q)).
This result illustrates how constraints can be dealt with to obtain conditions on the
primitive of the problem (here, the marginal rate of substitution between goods) that
yield monotonicity. Intuitively the condition states that the second good is Giffen pro-
vided that the marginal rate of substitution of the first good with respect to the second
is small compared to the elasticity of that rate of substitution with respect to x : if
the price of the second good increases, an increase in x would reduce the marginal
value of the first good compared to the second by so much that it is better to increase
23 More precisely, we assume that the Hessian of u is negative definite.
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consumption of the second good instead. Sørenson (2007) provides simple examples
for Giffen goods, which rely on a Leontief-type kink in the demand curve, whereas
the condition in Proposition 7 works with smooth primitives.
4.2 Equilibrium of a nonsupermodular game
Supermodular games have been widely studied with comparative-statics techniques,
yielding interesting results about the existence and monotonicity of equilibria (Vives
1990; Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Echenique 2002). Far less is known about monoto-
nicity properties of nonsupermodular games. Such games provide a good illustration
of how GMA can be used to explore a complex comparative-statics problem and get
some insights about its structure. We consider a game with two players in which each
player chooses two actions: a nonnegative quantity qi and a location zi on the real line.
Players have a type ti ∈ R corresponding to some preference in the location space.
When choosing qi , player i ∈ {1, 2} obtains the payoff
Π i (qi , zi , z j , ti ) = qi Ri (zi , z j , ti ) − Ci (qi ),
where Ci is a strictly convex cost function, Ri is player i’s revenue function, and j
denotes the index of the other player. For example, if two firms engage in a joint ven-
ture, qi may represent firm i’s investment, zi its final product positioning, ti its initial
preference or position, Ri is i’s return and Ci its opportunity cost from investing qi
in the joint venture rather than in other projects. We assume that Ri is supermodular
in (zi , z j ) and (zi , ti ) and strictly concave in zi . Note, however, that Π i is not in gen-
eral supermodular in (qi , zi ), so that standard results from the theory of supermodular
games do not apply. In fact, it is easy to verify that qi cannot be monotonic in ti or t j
over the entire parameter space. Therefore, monotonicity results are possible only if
one looks for other parameter moves.
Our goal is to find parameter moves that jointly increase players’ equilibrium invest-
ments (q∗1 , q∗2 ). The above supermodularity assumptions ensure that an increase in
player types increases their location decision. Still, such an increase does not neces-
sarily increase player i’s revenue Ri or his action qi .
Equilibrium conditions, based on the first order conditions for the two actions of
each of the two players, form a system of four equations:





Ri − (Ci )′′
Ri1





⎦ (x, t) = 0,
where x = (q1, z1, q2, z2) and t = (t1, t2), and Rik denotes Ri ’s partial derivative with
respect to its k-th variable. Hessian and cross-partial derivative matrices of f are
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Since we are interested in variations of q∗1 and q∗2 , we use the criterion
φ(q1, z1, q2, z2) = (q1, q2).
From Corollary 1, monotonicity directions v = (v1, v2) are given by the condition
−Dφ(x)[(Dx f )−1 Dt f ](x, t)v(t) ≥ 0.
After simplification, this yields Av ≥ 0, where
Aii = κ i [Ri3 + δRi13 Ri2 R j12],
and
Ai j = κ i [δR j13 Ri2(−Ri11)],
with κ i = −[(Ci )′′]−1 > 0 and δ = (R111 R211−R112 R212)−1. We assume that (−Ri11) >
Ri12 for i ∈ {1, 2}, ensuring that δ is positive. This condition means that the marginal
return of a player’s action is more sensitive to his own action than to the other player’s.
We also assume that if Ri1 = R j1 = 0 and ti > t j , then Ri2 and R j3 are nonnega-
tive while R j2 and R
i
3 are nonpositive. This means that, in equilibrium (when Ri1 =
R j1 = 0), player returns decrease if one widens the gap between their preferences
(conditions on R3’s), and player i’s return increases if player j’s action moves in the
direction of i’s preference (conditions on R2’s). Those assumptions will be satisfied,
for example, if one can check independently that ti > t j implies that zi ≥ z j in
equilibrium (this is likely to hold if player returns are symmetric), and that on the
domain {(zi , z j , ti , t j ) : zi ≥ z j and ti ≥ t j }, the above inequalities hold, as can easily
be checked for any particular form of the return functions.
Under those assumptions, one would expect that, as player preferences get closer
to each other, players will benefit more from their interaction and thus invest more.
Indeed, the off-diagonal elements of the matrix A are positive for i and negative for j ,
which already implies that if ti > t j , an increase of ti (higher type) causes player j to
reduce investment, while an increase in t j causes player i to increase investment. To
obtain global comparative statics, however, a joint move of player types is required,
which brings them closer in a particular direction. Thus, suppose, without loss of gen-
erality, that t1 > t2, and that t1 is decreased by R213, while t2 is increased by R113. The
effect on (q∗1 , q∗2 ) is proportional to
R213(−R13) + γ ((−R111) − R212), R113 R23 + γ ((−R211) − R112),
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where γ = R113 R213 > 0. As a result, investments increase in equilibrium as long as
a player’s action has more impact on his marginal return than on the other player’s,
that is if (−Ri11) > R j12. The slope R113/R213 can be interpreted as the ratio of players’
action-type complementarity. If player 1 exhibits more action-type complementar-
ity than player 2, increasing investments will be guaranteed only if 2’s preference is
increased by a larger amount than that by which 1’s preference is decreased. That
ratio is constant if players incur a quadratic cost by moving from ti to zi : Ri =
−µi (zi − ti )2 + ψ i,1(zi , z j ) + ψ i,2(z j , ti ) for i = 1, 2. With symmetric complemen-
tarity (µ1 = µ2), investments increase as player types get closer to each other, i.e.,
as |t1 − t2| decreases.24
4.3 Aggregation
GMA can be used to examine the comparative statics of a given criterion in terms of
aggregates of parameters, such as an arithmetic mean or, equivalently, a sum. As an
example, we use the GMA-method to establish, under fairly general conditions, that
a solution to (1) is monotonic with respect to the sum t1 + · · · + tm of the parameters
only if it is independent of the individual parameters conditional on that sum.25 The
proof of this result illustrates the use of imposed monotonicity paths (cf. Sect. 3.3).
Given a criterion φ and an information structure R, by Corollary 1, the condition
(x, v) ∈ R(t) × V (t |R) ⇒ −Dφ(x)[(Dx f )−1 Dt f ](x, t)v ≥ 0,
implies that trajectories generated by V (t |R) are monotonicity paths. By Theorem 1,
the last condition is also necessary to guarantee monotonicity.
Let t = (t1, . . . , tm) be a parameter vector, and consider the sum of its components,
sm = t1 + · · · + tm . Solution monotonicity in sm is stronger than solution monoto-
nicity in any given component of t : the former requires not only that the solution
is nondecreasing in each component of t , but also that it (weakly) increases when
a parameter ti is increased by more than the amount by which another parameter t j
is decreased, keeping other parameters fixed. For simplicity, it is assumed that X (t)
is nonempty for all t , and that fx < 0 everywhere. These assumptions are naturally
satisfied when (1) is obtained as the first-order necessary optimality condition for the
maximization of a strongly concave objective function on a convex set. The solution
set X (t) ≡ R(t) contains only a single element, denoted by x(t).
First, consider the simple case when m = 2. The first three steps of the GMA-
method in Sect. 3.2 yield that the GMA-cone with respect to monotonicity in s2 is
V (t |R) = {(τ1, τ2) ∈ R2 : τ1 + τ2 ≥ 0}.
24 For this symmetric quadratic case, there is an n-player equivalent to the result: types get “closer” if the
vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) gets closer (for the usual Euclidean distance) to the first bisector of the parameter
space, i.e., the line whose direction is given by the vector (1, . . . , 1).
25 By a simple nonlinear re-scaling of the parameter vector, this result can be extended to any additive
function that is strictly increasing in the parameters.
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This cone itself is generated by 	 = {(−1, 1), (1,−1), (1, 1)}. Hence, f must satisfy
(x, v) ∈ R(t) × 	 ⇒ − f −1x
[ ft1(x, t) ft2(x, t)
]
v ≥ 0. (11)
By substituting the different v ∈ 	, the last relation can be rewritten in the form
x ∈ R(t) ⇒ min{ ft1 + ft2 , ft1 − ft2 ,− ft1 + ft2}(x, t) ≥ 0,
which implies that ft1(x, t) = ft2(x, t) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ R(t). Let s = (s1, s2) =
(t1, t2) = t define a smooth change of parameters by t = ϕ(s) = (s1, s2 − s1), and let
F(x, s) = f (x, ϕ(s)).
Then s1 is a contra-variant coordinate, as Fs1(x, s) = ft1(x, ϕ(s)) − ft2(x, ϕ(s))
vanishes on R(ϕ(s)). Fix s and consider a differentiable selection p 
→ x(s, p).
Since Fx (x(ϕ(s)), s) = f (x(ϕ(s)), ϕ(s)) < 0 by assumption, the solution in the new
coordinates, x(ϕ(s)), must be independent of s1. It can therefore depend only on the
parameter aggregate s2. Note that the information structure in this example is given
by R(t) ≡ {x(t)}: the mere knowledge that x(t) is a solution to (1), along with the
stipulated requirement that x be nondecreasing in s2, is enough to imply that x(ϕ(s))
depends only on s2. This conclusion generalizes to more than two parameter dimen-
sions.
Theorem 4 (Monotonicity and dependence on aggregates) Assume that the solution
to (1) is a singleton, i.e., X (t) ≡ {x(t)} on T . If
s′m = t ′1 + · · · + t ′m > t1 + · · · + tm = sm ⇒ x(t ′) ≥ x(t)
for all t ′ = (t ′1, . . . , t ′m), t = (t1, . . . , tm) ∈ T , then there exists a function y : R →
X such that x(t) = y(sm) on T , i.e., the solution depends only on the aggregate sm .
Proof The result has been already established for m = 2. For m > 2 consider the
following induction step. Assume that the result is true for k ≥ 2 parameters, and
examine the case of k + 1 parameters, so that t = (t1, . . . , tk+1). For a fixed tk+1,
the solution x(t) is nondecreasing in sk and thus depends only on sk , by induction
hypothesis. Thus, x depends only on sk and tk+1. Moreover, x is monotonic in the
sum s = sk + tk+1. Applying the argument for the two-dimensional result to the
parameter vector (sk, tk+1) then establishes that there is a function y : R → X such
that x(t) = y(sk + tk+1) = y(sk+1), which concludes our proof. unionsq
Theorem 4 implies that the only way a unique solution to a parameterized equation
of the form (1) can be monotonic in a parameter average is if this average is a “sufficient
statistic” for all the parameters involved in its computation. There have been numer-
ous studies in aggregation and statistics concerning the question of which structures of
problem (1) imply that solutions depend solely on a given parameter aggregate (see,
e.g., the treatise by Blackorby and Shorrocks 1996). The monotonicity analysis per-
formed here considers the converse question and therefore yields necessary structural
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conditions: monotonicity in an additive aggregate implies that the aggregate must be
a sufficient statistic for its components.26
In aggregation theory, a central question is to determine when some macroeconomic
variable will be monotonic in a certain aggregate value of household characteristics.
Combining Theorem 4 with previous aggregation results, the above analysis suggests
that aggregate monotonicity can occur only if the macroeconomic variable is deter-
mined by an equation where the aggregate value is the only determinant parameter.
Individual parameters may influence the function only through a multiplicative factor
that does not affect the root of the equation.
4.4 Robust productivity estimates
An important problem in applied industrial organization is the comparison of firms’
private productivity forecasts given their observable investment decisions. Olley and
Pakes (1996) consider a model in which firms base investment decisions on current
capital stock (observed by outsiders) and productivity forecasts (unobserved by out-
siders). They provide conditions under which investment decisions are monotonic in
productivity forecasts. Clearly, if a firm’s productivity forecast were the only parame-
ter influencing its investment decision, one could simply rank the firms’ productivity
forecasts based the observed investment decisions. However, since capital stock mate-
rially affects investment decisions, such a comparison of productivity forecasts across
firms is valid only for a fixed level of capital stock.
Quantitative monotonicity analysis can be used to show that it is possible to rank
two firms’ productivity estimates, as long as their capital stocks are close, and their
investment decisions differ sufficiently. In that sense the monotonicity disclosed by
GMA is robust with respect to perturbations, and thus allows for robust inference. To
simplify the exposition, we first consider a static setting where investment decisions
are based on a simple point estimate of a firm’s productivity, before discussing the
dynamic setting in which investment decisions are always based on the current forecast
for the next realization of the underlying Markovian productivity process.
4.4.1 Static setting
Suppose that the first-order condition of a firm’s investment problem is
f (x, k, p) = 0,
26 Another way to make the connection between monotonicity and dependence on additive aggregates is
as follows. Suppose that x(t) is monotonic in the sum s2 = t1 + t2. Fix t ′ = (t ′1, t ′2), and let s′2 = t ′1 + t ′2,
a = supt :t1+t2<s′2 {x(t)}, and b = inf t :t1+t2>s′2 {x(t)}. By assumption, a ≤ x(t
′) ≤ b. Continuity of x(t)
in t , as a consequence of the maximum theorem (Berge 1963), then implies that a = x(t ′) = b. This is true
for all x(t) such that t1 + t2 = s′2. Therefore, x(t) must be constant on the line t1 + t2 = s′2. This shows
that x depends only on the parameters through their sum.
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where x is the investment decision, k is the firm’s capital stock, and p is its productivity
estimate. Assuming invertibility of fx , the pseudo-gradient is (with t = (k, p))
w(x, t) = − f −1x
[ fk f p
]
(x, t).
Since we are interested only in the monotonicity of any solution x(k, p), the crite-
rion function here is simply φ(x) ≡ x . Since fx < 0 at any solution (second-order
condition, assuming strict concavity of the objective in the underlying maximization
problem), the firm’s investment decision increases if fkdk+ f pd p is positive. Suppose
one has observed two firms’ investment decisions, x1 = x(k1, p2) and x2 = x(k2, p2),
and it is known that their capital stocks are close, i.e., such that |k2 − k1| ≤ κ for
some κ > 0. Then, if f p > ρ for some ρ > 0 and | fk | < η for some η < 0 on the
entire domain of f , then x2−x1 > θ > 0 implies p2 > p1+(θ−κη)/ρ. In particular,
an observed investment difference between firm 2 and firm 1 of more than κη implies
that firm 2’s productivity forecast is surely larger than firm 1’s productivity forecast,
no matter what the firms’ precise capital stocks are.
4.4.2 Dynamic setting
In the dynamic setting considered by Olley and Pakes, productivity follows a stochas-
tic Markov process. The only parameters affecting a firm’s investment decision are
capital stock, productivity level, and the productivity forecast.27
Letting p˜ (or p˜|p) denote the (random) next-period productivity level given that
the current productivity level is p, a firm’s value function Π(k, p) solves the Bellman
equation
Π(k, p) = max
x
{π(k, p) − c(x, k) + βE[Π(x + (1 − δ)k, p˜)|p]} ,
where π is the current-period gross payoff, c is the adjustment-cost function, β is the
per-period discount factor, and δ represents the per-period depreciation rate. Convexity
of c in x and concavity of π imply that the optimal dynamic investment policy x(k, p)
satisfies the first-order necessary optimality condition
f (x, k, p) = βE[Πk(x + (1 − δ)k, p˜)|p] − cx (x, k) = 0.
Applying the above analysis yields the following result.
Proposition 8 If there exists η > 0 such that
|β(1 − δ)E[Πkk(x + (1 − δ)k, p˜)|p] − cxk(x, k)| < η
for all (x, k, p), then
x(k2, p2) > x(k1, p1) > η|k2 − k1| ⇒ p2 > p1,
27 In accordance with recent literature (cf. Olley and Pakes 1996), we abstract from the firm’s age in this
example. For simplicity, we also rule out exit, which means that salvage values are sufficiently low.
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where x(ki , pi ), for i ∈ {1, 2}, denotes the optimal investment given a current capital
stock of ki and a current productivity estimate of pi .
Therefore, any upper bounds on the concavity of the firm’s value function and on the
cross-derivative of the cost function with respect to capital and productivity allow for
a robust inter-firm comparison of private productivity estimates based on observed
investments, as long as capital stocks in the industry are not too different.
4.5 Comparative dynamics of equilibrium paths
Given a parameterized description of a time-varying process in a Euclidean space,
monotone comparative dynamics obtain when a parameter increase results in the pro-
cess taking on higher values at all points after the initial time. Such an approach to
comparative dynamics, with applications to growth, has been studied by Brock and
Mirman (1972); Mendelsohn and Sobel (1981); Becker (1983), and Amir et al. (1991).
In what follows, we take the view that comparative dynamics is equivalent to a
comparative-statics problem in which the variable is the entire process, and the equa-
tion f = 0 describes its law of motion.
This section exploits the concept of pseudo-gradients to derive comparative dynam-
ics. The variable x is a function of time, the evolution of which is described by some
dynamic equation. The goal is to determine nontrivial changes of the dynamic equa-
tion that increase the value of x at each instant. Cast in the GMA framework, com-
parative dynamics imply that pseudo-gradients must satisfy a differential equation.
This equation is first used to prove a simple result relating local properties of the
dynamic equation to the monotonicity of x , and then to show how global properties
of the dynamic equation can be incorporated into monotonicity analysis, providing a
highly stylized interpretation of the impact of global cycles on comparative dynamics
(Proposition 10).
For this application, X is infinite-dimensional. In keeping with standard notation
in dynamic systems, the parameter is denoted by α instead of t , and t now denotes
time. Suppose that the evolution of a process can be described in terms of the initial
value problem
x˙(t) = g(x, t, α), x(0) = x0, (12)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], where x0 ∈ RN , T ∈ R++, and α ∈ A = [α
¯
, α¯] ⊂ Rm (with α
¯
< α¯)
are given constants, and g : RN ×[0, T ]×Rm → RN is a smooth function. If x(t, α)
is any given solution to the initial value problem (12), then monotone comparative
dynamics (MCD) for this dynamic system obtains if
αˆ ≥ α ⇒ (x(t, αˆ) ≥ x(t, α), ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]). (13)
To treat this problem within our framework, we first split the time interval [0, T ]
into n subintervals Ik = [tk−1, tk], k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where tk = kT/n and n ≥ 1.
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Discretizing the initial value problem (12) accordingly yields





gk(xk, α), k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (12′)
where xk = x(tk) and gk(·, α) = g(·, tk, α). Interpreting (x1, . . . , xn) as an (nN )-
dimensional variable and (g1, . . . , gn) as an (nN )-dimensional function, the discret-
ized initial value problem (12′) is of the form (1) with f = ( f1, . . . , fn), and
fk(x1, . . . , xn, α) = xk − xk−1 − (T/n)gk(xk, α).
The corresponding pseudo-gradient with respect to any direction (α, v) ∈ A × Rm is
Wn(α, v) =
{

















· v, 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1
}
,
where w0 = 0. By taking the limit as n → ∞, we therefore obtain an N -dimensional
pseudo-gradient with functional components
W∞(α, v) =
{
w ∈ C1 ([0, T ], Rm) : w˙(t) − ∂g(x, t, α)
∂x
w
= ∂g(x, t, α)
∂α
v, w(0) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]
}
for any (α, v) ∈ A × Rm . The set of directions w that constitutes the pseudo-
gradient W∞(α, v) is defined by the linear initial value problem
w˙(t) − ∂g(x(t, α), t, α)
∂x
w = ∂g(x(t, α), t, α)
∂α
v, w(0) = 0,
for all t ∈ [0, T ], any solution of which can be written in the form










where F is an N × N fundamental matrix28 satisfying the matrix differential equation
F˙(t) = ∂g(x(t, α), t, α)
∂x
F(t)







, t ∈ [0, 1]. When N > 1, the fundamental matrix
cannot be given in closed form.
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for all t ∈ [0, T ] and F(0) = 1. The positive cone V ⊂ Rm that admits MCD in the
sense of (13) corresponds to the set of directions v such that w(t, α, v) ≥ 0.










⎠ γ˙ (λ) ≥ 0, (14)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and all t ∈ [0, T ], then
x(t, γ (λˆ)) ≥ x(t, γ (λ))
for all λˆ ≥ λ ∈ [0, 1] and all t ∈ [0, T ].
As a first application of Theorem 5, suppose that α is one-dimensional, and that
one wishes to find conditions under which x(t, α) is nondecreasing in α. Since F is














(x(t, α), t, α)dt ≥ 0
for u ∈ [0, T ]. This inequality is always true if ∂g/∂α is nonnegative.
Proposition 9 If m = 1 and ∂g/∂α is nonnegative, then x(t, α) is nondecreasing
in α.
This proposition can also be proved by dynamic analysis,29 but is much simpler to
prove using Theorem 5. Hugget (2003) proves a similar result in discrete time, allowing
for Markov uncertainty.
As another application, suppose that x represents a firm’s capital, the growth of
which at time t depends on some investment return h(x, t) and some exogenous fac-
tor k(t). The goal is to assess the impact of k(t) on the growth of x : with x˙(t) =
h(x, t) + αk(t), we wish to derive conditions on h and k so that an increase in the
weight α of the external shock k increases x . If k changes sign (e.g., exhibiting cyclical
behavior), ∂g/∂α is not always positive, so that Proposition 9 does not apply. From








hx (x(s, α), s)ds
⎞
⎠ k(t)dt ≥ 0
29 Let α < β and y(t) = x(t, β)− x(t, α). Then y(0) = 0 and y′(t) = g(x(t, β), t, β)− g(x(t, α), t, α),
so y′(t) ≥ 0 whenever y(t) = 0. We wish to show that y(t) ≥ 0 for all t . The only problem is if y(t) = 0
and y′(t) = 0 for some t . Then consider the smallest s > t such that y′(s) = 0. By construction, y(t ′) = 0
on [t, s], so y′(s) ≥ 0, implying that y′(s) > 0. Thus, y can never become negative.
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for all u ∈ [0, T ]. In order to obtain monotonicity, there must be some sense in which k
has an overall positive effect on x , despite sometimes having locally negative effects.
Thus, we assume that for all t , K (t) = ∫ t0 k(s)ds ≥ 0. We now use the following
lemma, whose proof is omitted.30
Lemma 1 If ψ is such that ∫ t0 ψ(s)ds ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ] and v is a decreasing
function, then ∫ t0 v(s)ψ(s)ds ≥ v(t)
∫ t
0 ψ(s)ds.
Applying the lemma to ψ(t) = k(t) and v(t) = exp
(
− ∫ t0 hx (x(s, α), s)ds
)
, which
is decreasing in t if hx is nonnegative, we have proved the following result.31
Proposition 10 Suppose that x˙(t) = h(x, t) + αg(t) and x(0) = x0, with h non-
decreasing in x and
∫ t
0 g ≥ 0 for all t .32 Then x(t, α) is nondecreasing in α for
all t .
This result can be interpreted (within a highly stylized, deterministic context) as
follows: if a firm’s growth is subject to exogenous global cycles, each of which has an
overall positive effect, an increased impact of these cycles on the firm results in the
firm possessing higher capital at all times.
5 Conclusion
Analyzing the monotonicity of solutions to optimization or equilibrium problems is
often a difficult task. Despite the recent advances in MCS, many problems in economic
theory and other fields do not fit the mold of standard techniques, which are based on
supermodularity on lattices or on other ordinal concepts, and one is led to either focus
on very simple models or make strong assumptions in order to obtain intuitive monoto-
nicity results. GMA extends the previous literature on comparative-statics analysis in
several directions. First, it provides a new way of endogenously generating parameter
moves that yield monotonicity. This may result, for example, in partitions of the param-
eter space into regions where simple but region-dependent parameter moves do indeed
yield monotonicity. It may also result in the emergence of some particular aggregate
of the parameters, such as the notion of parameter closeness derived in Sect. 4.2.
This construction is achieved thanks to the introduction of a new concept, that of a
pseudo-gradient, which summarizes all available information (provided in the form of
an information set) for the determination of monotonicity properties. Second, GMA
naturally permits consideration of the monotonicity of functions of a solution instead
of the monotonicity of the solution itself as in the standard analysis. This flexibility
proves important when analyzing the monotonicity properties of complex multivari-
ate models. Third, GMA may be used to derive conditions under which monotonicity
30 The lemma is nontrivial, since ψ has no sign requirement. Quah and Strulovici (2008) prove a different
version of the lemma, which is equivalent to this one by a change of variables.
31 To our knowledge, this result cannot be proved using existing theorems of comparative dynamics (since g
can take negative values). It can be derived along the lines of Footnote 29.
32 As usual, we assume that h and g are smooth, to guarantee existence and uniqueness of x(·, α) for all α.
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obtains with respect to imposed moves of the parameters, for example correspond-
ing to parameter aggregates. Fourth, the method introduced here is easily extended to
derive bounds on the sensitivity of variables (or functions thereof) to parameters. Such
quantitative results largely escape the reach of standard ordinal methods. Fifth, GMA
introduces several concepts and insights regarding the nature of comparative statics,
for example in dealing with constraints or exploiting additional information about the
problem structure. Owing to its simplicity and systematic nature, GMA is a natural
and potentially crucial first step to analyze monotonicity in complex problems, and is
in many ways complementary to ordinal methods.
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